In the first part of this paper, the importance of concerted behavior by workers emerges from examination of some prominent theories which set out to explain wage rigidity in the face of declining demand or excess supply without abandoning key elements of competitive theory. In the second part, the importance of certain Keyenesian and satisficing behavioral postulates in motivating concerted worker behavior is. suggested by the shortcomings of some contemporary economic models of the trade union which assume expected utility maximization and accurate knowledge of market conditions under ordinary circumstances.
Ulman -3 evidently distilled his theory of individual worker psychology from his observation and (sympathetic) • interpretation of union behavior and labor unrest in Britain's interwar period (Keynes, 1963 ed.; Renshaw, 1975) . Inversely, however, one can infer a Keynesian theory of the formation of trade unions: if workers cannot individually give effect to their unique propensities in the face of employer opposition, they will be impelled to seek (contramarket) effectiveness through "combination on the part of a group of workers" (Keynes, pp. 15 and 16) . But subsequent economists who have sought to explain wage rigidity under competitive conditions as well as adverse market conditions have hypothesized situations under which it might be accepted by employers as well as their employees. i
Human capitalists
The problem has been addressed inferentially by human capital theory in attempting to explain, not equilibrium unemployment, but temporary labor hoardingi.e., employment in excess of labor demand at the going wage. This theory holds that firms would retain some employees whose training is highly specific to their operations during temporary downswings in demand, not only as long as revenues attributable to their work cover their wages, but even after they fail to do so (Becker, 1964) . The employer's object in hoarding these workers Draft 1/6/89
Ulman -4 would be to protect his investment in their training by minimizing the risk of losing them permanently.
Therefore employment in excess of currently depressed demand at current wages might be preferable to layoffs and/or wage reductions.
Although the analysis of specific human capital has frequently been offered as an explanation of labor hoarding during recessions, it can be regarded as consistent with layoffs. For, according to the theory, employers have been deemed to protect their human capital investments by offering workers with more firm-specific training higher wages in order to deter them from quitting.
And a wage high enough to preclude (or significantly reduce the probability of) quitting should also ensure a high recall rate, and should thus enable the firm to apply a policy of temporary layoffs to these workers as well as to more generally trained employees.
Moreover, the employer should be able to link a layoff policy with reductions in wages and still rest secure in the expectation that all (or most) souls departed will faithfully return to the fold when demand picks up. What attracts the specifically trained worker to the job for which he is best qualified is the premium which his wage commands over such alternative employment as the more general component of his training fits him for; and since wages for general training (in which employers make no investment, under competitive conditions) should fall Draft 1/6/89
Ulman -5 during a downswing in overall demand, wages of the more specifically trained workers can also decline without reducing the premiums and hence the incentives to remain on -and return to -the jobs in question. But, wage flexibility combined with layoffs does not generate involuntary unemployment (in a static and perfectly competitive economy). That is freely acknowledged by human capital theorists (Oi, 1962, p. 543 ), but it is the result which Keynesian and most other rigid-wage models have been driving at.
Implicit contracts
According to a theory that won considerable acceptance in the seventies, a combination of rigid wages and equilibrium unemployment can result from "implicit contracts" between employers and their employees, whereby the former insure the latter against the risk of wage reductions in bad times while the workers pay for this insurance in the same coin in which they supposedly pay for the acquisition of general, or transferable, skillsby accepting lower wage levels over the long haul than « * they might have secured if (in this case) they were less risk-averse (Azariadis, 1975; Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974) .
Implicit contract theory appears to reach Keynesian conclusions more effectively than the original analysis:
it ranges employers on the side of wage rigidity rather than in opposition; and it credits workers with Draft 1/6/89
Ulman -6 conventionally "rational" decision-making, while its own special psychological assumption of differentially greater risk aversion appears not implausible (and indeed could claim an ancient and respectable academic pedigree).
Nevertheless it was soon claimed that there was less to this model than meets the innocent eye. I don't pretend to follow the tortuous trail blazed by the theoretical critics, but two critical objections can be readily appreciated. First, why would not the firm be willing to offer the risk-shunning worker protection against reductions in employment as well as -or even in preference to -wages? (Akerlof and Myazaki, 1980) Second, if it is assumed that management knows more about the true state of business than its workers do, why could it not take advantage of such "private information" to cheat the latter; and, if it could, why would the workers buy insurance from such double dealers? Two theoretical counterrebuttals have been filed in reply to the first theoretical objection. Employers, it is claimed, would be reluctant to guarantee both wage rates and jobs against cyclical decline, because a guarantee of the wage bill would shift all of the variability in the firm's income to profits. And while workers may seek to minimize the risk of (downward) variation in their incomes, the willingness of employers to take risks has limits of its own. (The assumption of Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -7 differential risk aversion is thus weakened.) As for the workers, they might be unwilling to buy a contract which precludes reductions in employment while allowing wages to vary if their employers cannot be prevented from taking advantage of their ignorance by falsely claiming that business is worse than it really is and then proceeding to reduce wage rates. Since employers would not gain any advantage by reducing employment under a jobs-only contract in the same situation, the wage-only guarantee would appear to be rehabilitated (Grossman and Hart, 1983) . But since under the latter the employer may require that his employees work more hours in good times than in bad times, he now has an incentive to claim that business is better than it really is and proceed to make his employees work more hours than they would wish. The upshot seems to be that such a constant-wage contract is associated with "overemployment" and hence can't explain involuntary unemployment (Azariadis and Stiglitz, 1983; Green and Kahn, 1983) .
Be all that as it may, the existence of long-term employment relationships which offer workers significant elements of security along with sticky wage rates in downswings, while also permitting temporary layoffs (at least in the U.S.), is well known to observers and historians of industrial relations. However, the incidence of these arrangements has been highest in large-scale firms located in the more oligopolistic 
Efficiency wages
A less conventional theory of sticky wages and involuntary unemployment -but one of long standingholds that employers are reluctant to reduce wages when confronted by a downswing in demand because they fear that doing so would result in a reduction in worker efficiency. According to a recent version of this theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) , the individual worker is deterred from "shirking" only by the probability that he will be caught and fired from a job that pays him more Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -9 than he could hope to receive elsewhere (i.e., on another job or on unemployment compensation). If employers wish to reduce wages, they would have to spend more on "monitoring" (supervision) to prevent increased shirking and loss of productivity; if, instead, they hold the line on wages, shirking will be restrained by the resulting increase in unemployment throughout the economy and the consequent fear of job loss. Detection is not the primary problem when everyone is breaking some rule or other. Potential economies of exemplary discipline (singling out ringleaders) are restricted in the presence of group cohesiveness; and the cost of multiple replacements is "lumpy" (Ulman, 1987) .
Still, restriction of output by unorganized workers has its limitations as a wage-earner weapon. It may avert wage reductions, but the threat of strikes by continuous associations, established over wider competitive areas, is better able "to exact higher wages or more favorable working conditions" (Slichter, 1920) .
Informal and ad hoc collective action has not infrequently given way to full-fledged trade unionism and collective bargaining. That sequence, however, is Draft 1/6/89 neither inevitable nor irreversible; nor could refusal by employers to reduce wages in bad times always be taken as evidence of a credible threat of unionization.
But (wrote Hicks in 1932)...even in a market where labour is still unorganised, the principal check of this sort on the action of employers is generally their fear that reductions will stimulate combined resistance (1964, p. 137) .
Segmented markets
Some of the factors that have.been assigned causal roles in the theorizing about unemployment and unresponsive wage levels have also been cited in attempts to explain unresponsive wage structures which mark the boundaries separating labor markets containing good jobs at good wages from labor markets containing bad jobs at low wages. Instead of exerting downward pressure on the higher sectoral wages, the excess supplies of labor available to the "primary" market exert downward pressure on the "secondary" markets. How can this economically perverse result be explained?
One influential account (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) attributed high wages in the internal markets in major part to what its authors regarded as the "tremendous amount of power" conferred on workers who possessed jobspecific skills (or human capital) and on whom enterprise managers must depend for the training of junior employees; and they also assigned to "custom" a role in motivating employees to resist changes in wages and other (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich, 1982; Reich, 1984) . Slichter (1929) had found the origin of internal labor markets in attempts by big corporations to preclude a return to unionism by maintaining wages relative to prices in the depression of 1920-21, as a result of which "employers were compelled to make their men more efficient." This they did "by developing a stable work force and maintaining the good will and cooperation of the men" through an array of benefit programs, promotion ladders, and other paternalistic devices which came collectively to be known as "Welfare Capitalism" and which, it might be added, made it more feasible for employers to invest in the development of those firmspecific skills that were later assigned a causal role in the analysis of wage differentiation and market Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -13 segmentation. The imposition of high wages for these reasons meant that individual workers were denied the Ulman -15 under which unions could raise wages (of low-paid and immobile workers) at the expense of profits rather than jobs. But he also warned that normally and in the long run union power would be subject to restraint by strong forces of competition, substitution, and mobility. A union could find it possible to raise wages significantly and "permanently" only where specified conditions combined to make the demand for the labor of its members "stiff and inelastic" (Marshall, 1928 ed.) Analogy to the firm Nevertheless, acceleration of the decline of American unionism in the eighties was matched by an upsurge in the production of academic models of the union, which assumed its ability not only to set wages at premium levels but even, in most cases, to set them at whatever levels they saw fit. This work had been anticipated by a pioneering model produced by Dunlop (1944) In their adaptation of the "exit-voice" theory to industrial relations, Freeman and Medoff (1976 , 1979 , 1980 argue that unions can offset their negotiated wage increases by negotiated grievance procedures which, by providing employees with an alternative to guitting and a source of heightened dignity and morale, reduce turnover costs, encourage employer investment in training, and raise productivity. This, however, is a somewhat idealized view of how grievance systems under collective * bargaining have worked in practice and one which ignores their adversarial content. Moreover, the theory does not specify any institutional mechanism which links the grievance procedure to the process of wage determination, so that cost increases generated by the latter might be constrained to the productivity increases resulting According to another view, the flip side of the sort of increased productivity associated with unionism by the voice theory consists in more onerous or otherwise undesirable conditions of work. The latter might be taken as given and elicit unionism as a way to secure compensatory wage differentials for the workers involved, in which case the union voice is really a market echo.
Alternatively, the poorer nonpecuniary conditions of work can be regarded as adjustments made by employers to offset wage increases wrested from them by union muscle (Duncan and Stafford, 1980) . Evidence on the qualitative nature of nonpecuniary conditions of work, however, has tended to be (not surprisingly) tenuous and contradictory. Moreover, this argument ignores the fact that, at the same time that unions have bargained over pay, they have also sought to reduce required effort or Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -21 * increase security by "bargaining over the production function." Thus instead of a combination of poor working conditions and higher productivity, collective bargaining could be associated with a combination of favorable working conditions and lower productivity. In contrast with both of these possible outcomes, the voice theory envisions a combination of better conditions and higher productivity. But whatever its shortcomings, this theory has the merit of focussing attention on some of the nonwage bargaining activities of the union in its quest for equitable treatment, security, and protection against the imposition of onerous working conditions on its members.
Efficient contracts
If the voice theory suggests that unions, through' devices like the grievance procedure, make it profitable for employers to hire more labor at the union wage, the "efficient contract" theory asserts that unions oblige employers to hire more labor than they would wish to at that wage. However, the economist regards the outcome of Ulman -22 occur if the firm agreed to employ exactly as much labor at the union wage as it would have at a competitively determined wage (Hall and Lilien, 1979) .
Although collective agreements have only rarely specified minimum overall levels of employment or total wage bills, as Leontief (1946) had anticipated, it was suggested (by McDonald and Solow, 1981) that the same result might -although it need not (Ulman, 1955) Thus the union must make the best of a wage-wage instead of a wage-employment tradeoff: it will set the union wage high enough to induce a nonunion sector within its jurisdiction, but not one so large that it will make the probability of working at that wage too low or that it will induce too low a nonunion wage for which some of its members must work.
In depicting the economy as a group of partially organized sectors, this theory accords with the reality of the contemporary American scene. And if more unions were to allow their wage policies to be more influenced by nonunion competition, they might yet become better able to achieve a state of equilibrium in their current environment. But in most cases, of course, membership in a union does not extend beyond the territory occupied by t its collective bargaining contracts. And even in jurisdictions where the duration of the job is short and members may go in and out of nonunion work, unions have been as likely as not to rationalize their wage policies on the belief -or in the hope -that "the best organizing weapon is a good contract" and that raising Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -24 the union wage might shrink the nonunion sector rather than their own domain.
End game
In the case of international competition, the wage level in the foreign "nonunion" part of an industry obviously cannot determine the utility of the representative worker in the manner described by the competitive model, because the worker does not have the option of working in the foreign sector. Presumably the union would be confronted once again with a wageemployment tradeoff, and the latter would reflect the strength of the Marshallian determinants of the responsiveness of employment to wage changes. In fact, a recent application of Marshallian demand analysis found a source of increased union bargaining power in declining --rather than increasing -levels of growth in demand in the 1970's. Lower (or in some cases zero) investment in more modern labor-saving plant and equipment could be counted on to reduce management's ability to substitute capital for labor and therefore to encourage the unions to press for higher wage increases (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985) . It has been widely presumed, on the other hand, that, as demand for the output of these U.S. manufacturing industries declined under the stimulus of increased foreign competition, it became more elastic;
and increased price elasticity of product demand would Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -25 make for increased wage elasticity of labor demand. Thus if labor became relatively more essential in production, its output became less essential to its employer's customers. Moreover, even if labor substitutability in production is assumed to be a more important influence than product substitutability in consumption, the argument implies that negotiated wage increases should decline during periods of industrial growth, as the authors themselves observe. It might strike one as more plausible to argue that unions, having demonstrated a tendency to underestimate their employers' capacity to substitute capital for labor in better times, happened to get things right in bad times; and, further, that they could distill short-term bargaining power from their employers' financial and even competitive weakness.
Insiders and outsiders
Another theory, based on the relationship between "insiders" and "outsiders," has also regarded economic decline as a source of union-imposed wage increases, but only when that decline is unanticipated and comes as a « "shock" (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) . The union is regarded as intent on setting the highest wage for its current members that is consistent with their continued employment. If it anticipates a decline in demand, it would accordingly reduce the wage by enough to induce the employer to leave the level of employment unchanged Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -26 (provided labor demand is sufficiently elastic, or responsive to a wage cut). But if the decline in demand comes as an unanticipated "shock," the employer makes the first adjustment by reducing employment. Because membership is conditioned on employment in the bargaining sector (in sharp contrast to the competitive model), reducing employment reduces the current membership.
After employment has been cut, the union would not seek to reduce wages in order to regain its former level; indeed, if demand is expected to recover (following the shock), the union would now press for a higher wage that would preclude an increase to the pre-shock levels of employment and membership. Yesterday's employment is yesterday's membership is history. Thus, the reduced level of employment tends to perpetuate itself (i.e., Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, 1983, p. 655) . And this theory, with the inclusion of the shock hypothesis, has been used to explain the persistence of high levels of Draft 1/6/89
Ulman -27 unemployment in the major European countries since the early 1980 's (Blanchard amd Summers, 1986 ). * However, the usefulness of the first propositionthat the union would restrain its wage in the interest of its current membership when adverse conditions are anticipated -is problematical. Given that assumption, the occurrence of a shock is required to explain subsequent wage rigidity or advancement; but why would not an employer feel encouraged to respond to an adverse shock by requesting a wage cut, or similar "concession," from a union which he knows to have been "normally" Ulman -29 is likely to be greater in the long run than in the short run.
• > We might also note that the hiring of outsiders may serve the interests of those already inside the union.
We have already discussed how a union (modeled on institutionalist lines) might realistically settle for a wage which permits expansion of output and employment provided that it can thereby satisfy some "externally" generated conditions of acceptability to the membership.
And in so doing it could reduce not only the probability of occurrence or probable duration of a strike but also (via an increase in membership) the per capita fixed costs of unionism. Thus, we are led to reject the implication of insider-outsider theory that a union will necessarily exploit an anticipated growth in demand by raising wages to levels high enough to preclude growth in employment. And with it we must also reject Henry Simons' (1944, p. 132) regarded as "a disturbing implication" by two proponents [Blair and Crawford, 1984, p. 556] .) American unions have in fact pushed very hard for the seniority principle (in opposition to managerial criteria of "ability, merit, and capacity"), primarily because it has served as the most tangible embodiment of their historic objectives of job security and "equity."
In this respect, however, they have viewed it primarily Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -31 (although not exclusively) as administering temporary layoffs in the course of a continuing and long-term • employment relationship, and they have invariably combined layoff seniority with recall seniority. Now in this capacity layoff seniority could command the support of short-service as well as senior employees, because the former could (as Slichter noted in an early assessment of guaranteed employment systems) "see a reasonably good prospect of soon becoming members of the preferred group" (Slichter, 1941, p. 129) . The younger worker might expect to enjoy the gains from a current settlement over a longer period in the future than an older worker could look forward to. And while the younger worker must accept a greater chance than the older one of being laid off after a given settlement, his or her costs of layoff & will be lower because wages foregone will be lower (both in absolute terms and relative to income from alternative sources). Thus, it by no means follows that the layoff cost of a settlement that is demanded by the more senior and secure members of a union would be regarded by their lower paid and less secure junior colleagues as unacceptably high. , Hence, the divergence of economic interests between workers with greater and less seniority is probably smaller than would be suggested by the difference between their average layoff probabilities. Nor is there reason to believe -as this theory would suggest (Blair and Draft 1/6/89 Ulman -32 Crawford, 1984) -that the wage policies of unions that ration work through rotary hiring halls (which conform to the usual theoretical assumption that all members face the same probability of employment) have been any more restrained than the wage-policies followed by seniority unions.
Conclusions
My comments on the first half of the double-barreled proposition with which this paper opens have largely 
